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proceedings. The court of appeals' ra-
tionale was that the exclusionary rule's ad-
ditional deterrent effect would be in-
significant or is greatly outweighed by its 
detrimental effect. However, the court 
therein concluded that if it can be shown 
that the illegally obtained evidence pro-
vided an incentive for the illegal seizure, 
the exclusionary rule would then apply. 
Such incentive would be evidenced by proof 
that seizure of the evidence was motivated 
by the possibility of enhancing the ac-
cused's sentence. See Logan, 289 Md. at 
486 and Lee, 540 F.2d at 1212. 
The court in Chase also analyzed how 
evidence falling under this category is han-
dled in probation revocation proceedings 
nationwide. Although the court noted 
semantical differences in the various ap-
proaches, it found that the prevailing ap-
proach applied is the "cost/benefit analy-
sis". "A probation revocation proceeding 
is not a criminal prosecution but is more in 
the nature of an administrative hearing in-
timately concerned with the probationer's 
rehabilitation. Thus, the court must bal-
ance the competing interests of the com-
munity with the rehabilitative goal of pro-
bation." Chase, 68 Md. App. at 422, 511 
A.2d 1128. In light of this standard, the 
court concluded that the exclusionary rule 
generally did not apply to probation revo-
cation proceedings. Combining Maryland 
case law with the semantical variations 
that exist nationwide, the court then in-
corporated a good faith exception into 
their newly adopted rule. In discussing 
their standard, Judge Wilner wrote: 
We agree, as a general proposition, that 
the deterrent effect of such an applica-
tion [of the exclusionary rule] will be 
minimal and that whatever marginal 
deterrent benefit might accrue would 
be far outweighed by the harmful ef-
fect of denying access to relevant in-
formation concerning a probationer's 
behavior .... [Nevertheless], [w]e can-
not permit the police to use this as an 
incentive to violate the Fourth Amend-
ment .... [W]e think the best way to 
deter individual violations is simply to 
apply the exclusionary rule upon a 
showing that the police did not act in 
good faith in effecting the search and 
seizure. The "good faith" standard ... 
encompasses all aspects of the officer's 
actions- how egregious the violation 
was, whether the officer knew the per-
son was on probation ... , what the cir-
cumstances were that led to the seizure. 
Chase, 68 Md. App. at 425, 426, 511 A.2d 
1128. 
In concluding their discussion of the "good 
faith" exception, the court held that the 
burden is on the defendant initially to pro-
duce lack of good faith. Upon this produc-
tion, the burden then shifts to the State to 
prove otherwise. 
At the time of publication this case was 
set for argument before the Court of Ap-
peals of Maryland. Although the court of 
appeals granted certiorari, it is doubtful 
that the case will be reversed because the 
court of special appeals' reasoning follows 
the national trend. Chase should help in 
lessening the frustration the law enforce-
ment community feels in their pursuit of 
justice and community protection. It re-
mains to be seen whether their pursuit will 
become a reality. 
-Christopher Hale 
jersey Shore State Bank v. United 
States: IRS NOT REQUIRED TO 
PROVIDE NOTICE AND A 
DEMAND FOR PAYMENT TO 
A THIRD-PARTY LENDER PRIOR 
TO INITIATING A CIVIL SUIT TO 
COLLECT EMPLOYMENT TAXES 
In Jersey Shore State Bank v. United 
States, 479 U.S. __ , 87-1 U.S.T.C. 
para. 9131 (1987}, the Supreme Court in a 
unanimous decision held that the IRS was 
not required to provide notice and a de-
mand for payment to a third-party lender 
who is liable under I.R.C. § 3505 prior to 
initiating a civil suit to collect employment 
taxes. This decision resolved a conflict be-
tween the circuits and is consistent with 
the interpretation of the Third and Ninth 
circuits. 
The Supreme Court in Jersey Shore State 
Bank considered the relationship between 
I.R.C. § 3505 (which provides for personal 
liability on the part of third parties paying 
or providing funds for wages) and I.R.C. 
§ 6303(a) (which requires that notice of an 
assessment be provided to persons liable 
for unpaid taxes before an assignment can 
be imposed}. In rejecting the bank's claim 
that the government was required under 
I.R.C. § 6303(a) to provide notice and de-
mand for payment to a lender bank that is 
liable under I.R.C. § 3505, the Court 
determined that a third-party lender is not 
the "person" intended to be protected un-
der I.R.C. § 6303(a). 
I.R.C. § 3505 applies to a third-party 
lender, surety or other person who is not 
an employer, but who pays wages either 
directly to that employee or group of em-
ployees, or supplies the funds to pay those 
employees. I.R.C. § 3505(a) imposes lia-
bility on those lenders, sureties or persons 
for a sum equal to any unpaid withholding 
taxes and interest if the wages were paid 
directly to the employee. However, under 
I.R.C. § 3505(b), if they did not pay the 
employees directly, but provided the funds 
to the employer, their liability would be 
limited to 25% of the amount of the loan. 
Prior to this section's enactment in 1966, 
the employers were the only individuals 
subject to liability. 
I.R.C. § 3505 was enacted in order to 
correct problems which occurred when 
employers obtained net payroll financing. 
United States v. Jersey Shore State Bank, 
781 F.2d 974, 976 (3d Cir. 1986). Net pay-
roll financing, used frequently in the con-
struction industry, is a practice whereby 
the lender provides funds for payment of 
employees' net wages, but not for payment 
of withholding taxes. This type of financ-
ing usually results when a financially 
strapped sub-contractor cannot meet its 
payroll obligations. The general contrac-
tor will then pay the sub-contractor's em-
ployees' net wages. Problems arise when 
the sub-contractor is unable to pay with-
holding taxes to the government while the 
government is required to credit the em-
ployees account. In such cases "[ r ]ecourse 
against the employer [is] often fruitless, 
because it [is] frequently without any fi-
nancial resources. And the government 
could not proceed against third parties 
who paid the net wages because they were 
not 'employers' under the code, and there-
fore not liable for the taxes." United States 
v. Jersey Shore State Bank, 781 F.2d 974, 
976 (3d Cir. 1986). 
In the current case, Jersey Shore State 
Bank provided net payroll financing to 
Pennmount Industries, Inc., from the 
fourth quarter of 1977 through the first 
quarter of 1980. The government in its 
complaint alleged that Jersey Shore paid 
wages directly to Pennmount employees 
and supplied funds for the purpose of pay-
ing wages, with the knowledge that Penn-
mount did not intend to or would not be 
able to make timely payments or deposits 
of the federal taxes required to be deducted 
and withheld. The complaint also alleges 
that the Bank's liability is $76,547.57 
plus interest under I.R.C. § 3505(a}, and 
$72,069.00 plus interest under I.R.C. 
§ 3505(b). The district court granted the 
bank's motion for summary judgment be-
cause of the government's failure to pro-
vide timely notice as required by I.R.C. 
§ 6303(a). The United States appealed and 
the third circuit reversed. In examining 
the legislative history of the statute, the 
third circuit concluded that 6303(a) did 
not apply to collection actions under 3505 
because 6303(a) was intended to protect 
taxpayers from harsh administrative col-
lection procedures. The court noted, how-
ever, that under I.R.C. § 3505, the third-
party lender was not in danger of having 
any of its property seized or attached to 
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satisfy the obligation as did an employer 
under § 6303(a). The court observed that 
"[i]n a civil action service of the govern-
ment's complaint provides the [third-party 
lender] with all the notice required .... " 
781 F.2d 974 at 981 (3d Cir. 1986). 
Jersey Shore, dissatisfied with the court's 
ruling, petitioned the Supreme Court for a 
writ of certiorari. The Court granted the 
writ in order to resolve the inter-circuit 
conflict. The Court then went on to affirm 
the decision of the Third Circuit. 
ChiefJustice Rehnquist, writing for the 
Court, observed that there are three grounds 
for demonstrating a lack of connection be-
tween § 6303(a) and § 3505. First, I.R.C. 
§ 3505 does not declare that a lender is 
"liable for unpaid taxes" which would give 
rise to the I.R.C. § 6303(a) notice require-
ment. Rather, a lender's liability under 
§ 3505 only arises if it pays wages directly 
to an employee or supplies funds for the 
wages with actual notice or knowledge that 
the employer is either unable to make 
timely payment of the withholding taxes 
or has no intention of doing so. The Court 
found that a third-party lender is deemed 
to have such actual notice or knowledge 
from the time- in the exercise of due dili-
gence-the lender would have been aware 
that the employer would not or could not 
make timely payments. "[A] prudent lender 
could be alerted to its liability under sec-
tion 3505 at the time it engaged in what 
the government describes as net payroll 
financing .... " ld. at 87,115 (1987). Fur-
thermore, the Court noted that, "[S]ureties 
can protect themselves against any losses 
attributable to withholding taxes by in-
cluding this risk ofliability in establishing 
their premiums, and lenders by including 
the amounts in their loans and taking ade-
quate security." Citing, S. Rep. No. 1708, 
89th Cong., 2d Sess., 23 (1966); H.R. 
Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 22 
(1966). 
Secondly, the Court considered the fact 
that employers and lenders are in different 
positions. While employers are subject to 
the government's summary collection pro-
cedures soon after unpaid employment 
taxes are assessed, the government may 
only forcibly collect against a lender by 
filing a civil suit in court. Thus, an em-
ployer has a far greater need for an assess-
ment notice than a third-party lender who 
is not subject to summary collection pro-
cedures. 
Lastly, the Court considered the actual 
content of the§ 6303(a) notice. Under this 
section, the government must not only give 
notice to each person liable for unpaid tax 
but the notice must contain 1) the amount 
assessed and 2) the demand for payment. 
The Court pointed out that a third-party 
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lender generally will not be concerned with 
the amount assessed because it may include 
the employer's share of the unpaid Social 
Security taxes for which the lender is not 
liable. See, H.R. Rep. No. 1884, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess., 21 (1966). Thus, the no-
tice required under § 6303(a) is likely to 
demand payment for an amount different 
from that for which the lender is liable. 
This ruling by the Supreme Court makes 
clear that any lender who engages in net 
payroll financing is subject to suit, without 
the notice provided under 6303(a), if the 
employer fails to pay or deposit the required 
withholding taxes and the lender can be 
said to have actual notice or knowledge 
that the employer is not making timely 
withholding taxes. 
-Robert R. Tousey 
Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates, 
Inc.: MARYLAND REFUSES TO 
MAKE EMPLOYERS LIABLE FOR 
INJURIES CAUSED BY 
EMPLOYEES WHO BECAME 
INTOXICATED AT THEIR 
OFFICE PARTIES 
In Kuykendall v. Top Notch Laminates, 
Inc., No. 711 (Md. App. filed Feb. 9, 1987), 
the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, 
affirmed the dismissal from the Circuit 
Court for Montgomery County, by hold-
ing that an employer who allegedly served 
alcohol to an employee at a party, who later 
crashed his car into an automobile, was not 
liable for his employee's actions. 
Because the case was dismissed below, 
under Maryland Rule 2-322(2), the factual 
allegations advanced to Court of Special 
Appeals of Maryland were taken directly 
from the complaint, averring that Evelyn 
Hargis was killed instantly when the ve-
hicle she was driving was struck head-on 
on December 23, 1985. Ms. Hargis was 
survived by her husband Jesse W. Kuy-
kendall, and a minor daughter, Christina. 
The complaint stated that Charles E. 
Wilkes, Jr. and Robert Dean Wade, em-
ployees of Top Notch Laminates, Inc. 
(Top Notch), "were driving their separate 
cars while drunk." According to the allega-
tions contained in the complaint, Wilkes 
and Wade were "swerving back and forth 
on the roadway trying to pass or to prevent 
the other from passing." During their 
"horse-play", Wilkes "swerved across 
the center line at a high rate of speed di-
rectly into the path of the car driven by 
Ms. Hargis." (slip op. at p. 1). 
Immediately prior to this occurrence 
both Wilkes and Wade had been attending 
a Christmas party hosted by their employer 
Top Notch, attendance to which was not 
required. (Emphasis supplied). The com-
plaint averred that Wilkes and Wade had 
been drinking "constantly from 12:30 p.m. 
to 5:00 p.m. and became highly intoxi-
cated." The complaint further indicated 
that Top Notch knew of their intoxicated 
condition, but continued to serve both men 
alcoholic beverages. (Id. slip op. at 2). 
From these facts Mr. Kuykendall filed suit 
against Top Notch, for himself, as personal 
representative of Ms. Hargis' estate, and 
for the couple's minor daughter, Christina 
(Appellants). The Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County granted Top Notch's mo-
tion to dismiss, with which this appeal 
ensued. 
On appeal, the court of special appeals 
was presented with the question of whether 
the employer could be held accountable 
for the actions ofWade and Wilkes, under 
traditional theories of negligence. As a pre-
liminary matter, the court reviewed the 
elements of a negligence cause of action, 
(1) a legal duty, (2) a failure to perform the 
duty, (3) damage to the plaintiff, and (4) the 
damage occasioned by the defendant's fail-
ure to perform the duty. The appellants 
first argued that the legal duty owed by 
Top Notch was established because of the 
"special relationship" established between 
employer and employee. The appellants 
theory was based upon the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts, 315, which provides: 
"There is no duty so to control the con-
duct of a third person as to prevent him 
from causing physical harm to another 
unless 
(a) a special relation exists between the 
actor and the third person which im-
poses a duty upon the actor to control 
the third person's conduct, or 
(b) a special relation exists between the 
actor and the other which gives to the 
other a right to protection." (Emphasis 
added). !d. slip op. at 6. 
The appellants alleged that this relation-
ship "conferred a duty upon Top Notch 
(the actor) to control the actions of Wilkes 
(the third person), as well as a duty to the 
general public to protect them from injury 
by Wilkes." (Id. slip op. at 6). This duty, 
appellants argued, was then breached when 
Top Notch permitted Wilkes and Wade to 
drive their own cars, because Top Notch 
chose not to prevent the two men from 
driving home while intoxicated. 
Appellants' second argument was that 
the employer failed to exercise reasonable 
care to avoid injury to third persons, thereby 
relying on Otis Engineering Corp. v. Clark, 
668 S. W .2d 307 ( 1983). In Otis, the Texas 
Supreme Court decided that, "an employer 
who knew his employee was incapacitated 
